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Reviewed by Thomas E. Baker*
TOUGH LAW
What Maitland said about the common law also can be said about
the queen subject in American law schools: constitutional law is
"tough law."1  It is tough to master-tough to teach and tough to
learn.
There are several reasons for this thorough difficulty. First, it is
not an exaggeration to say that the fate of the nation is often at stake
in constitutional cases and controversies, and constitutional decisions
have shaped our history as a people. Second, we Americans can lay
claim to inventing the field, and we have been continuously preoccu-
pied with reinventing it for more than two centuries of applied political
philosophy. Third, the Supreme Court is one of the most fascinating
institutions inside or outside government. Fourth, there is so much
extant material-more than five hundred Talmudic volumes of the
U.S. Reports full of majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions
augmented by the interpretations and implementations of various other
constitutional actors in the political branches.2 Fifth, every October
Term's docket presents novel issues for decision, and each new
nomination and confirmation renders much of constitutional law
indeterminate, so there is a constant sense of uncertainty, anticipation,
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1. "This prepares us for the remark that taught law is tough law." FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE 18 (1901).
2. Thomas E. Baker, Tyrannous Lex, 82 IOWA L. REV. 689, 698 (1997).
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and discovery in the field.3  Sixth, constitutional analysis-if one
thinks deeper and broader than mere doctrine and three-pronged
tests-takes on metaphysical, quasi-religious qualities of immanence
and transcendence that are far more profound than any other subject
in law school. For these and other reasons, constitutional law is the
toughest subject in the curriculum.
This review essay will explain why I use Ronald D. Rotunda's
casebook, Modern Constitutional Law" and how I go about teaching
Constitutional Law.
BECOMING A MASTER OF THE SUBJECT
You must master your subject before you can expect to master its
teaching. This obliges ability, effort, humility, and an abiding sense
of responsibility.' To aspire to become a constitutionalist-a true
scholar of the Constitution-one must be prepared to think great
thoughts or, at least, one must spend time studying the great thoughts
of others, in the grand tradition of liberal education.6 There is all that
law to learn, to be sure, which poses a continuing challenge.7 But you
3. Thomas E. Baker, Exercising the Amendment Power to Disapprove of Supreme Court
Decisions: A Proposal for a "Republican Veto," 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q 325, 327-330 (1995).
4. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1997).
5. Thomas E. Baker, A Law Student's Responsibility for a Liberal Education, 20 TEX. TECH.
L. REv. 1153, 1155-56 (1989). See also Thomas E. Baker & Timothy W. Floyd, The Role of
Religious Convictions in the Teaching of Law Students, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 77 (1992).
6. [L]iberal education consists in listening to the conversation among the greatest
minds. But here we are confronted with the overwhelming difficulty that this
conversation does not take place without our help-that in fact we must bring about
that conversation. The greatest minds utter monologues. We must transform their
monologues into a dialogue, their "side by side" into a "together.".... Since the
greatest minds contradict one another regarding the most important matters, they
compel us to judge of their monologues; we cannot take on trust what any one of them
says. On the other hand, we cannot but notice that we are not competent to be judges.
LEO STRAUSS, LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 7 (1968).
7. Alexander Hamilton gave this reason for Article III's "good behaviour" tenure:
It has been frequently remarked with great propriety that a voluminous code of laws is
one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free
government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and point
out their duty in every particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be
conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness
of mankind that the records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very
considerable bulk and must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent
knowledge of them. Hence it is that there can be but few men in the society who will
have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges. And making
the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be
still smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the requisite knowledge.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 464, 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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must also add equal parts of history, political science, and philosophy
to your personal curriculum; you must become a citizen of the past yet
remain a citizen of the present.8 As a constitutional scholar, you are
haunted by the fear that you will never have anything worthwhile to
say. After perhaps a decade of eavesdropping, you may attempt
tentatively to join the conversation.' But even then there is a
considerable risk of embarrassment that what you think is brilliant is
simply silly or merely eccentric."0
Professor Ronald D. Rotunda is a master of our subject. Indeed,
Rotunda is a major brand name in constitutional law.1 First, there
8. I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass on a
question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton and
Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and
Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant,
as with the books which have been specifically written on the subject. For in such
matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions before
him. The words he must construe are empty vessels into which he can pour nearly
anything he will. Men do not gather figs of thistles, nor supply institutions from judges
whose outlook is limited by parish or class. They must be aware that there are before
them more than verbal problems; more than final solutions cast in generalizations of
universal applicability. They must be aware of the changing social tensions in every
society which makes it an organism; which demand new schemata of adaptation; which
will disrupt it, if rigidly confined.
LEARNED HAND, Sources of Tolerance, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF LEARNED HAND 81 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1974). See generally Thomas E. Baker &
James E. Viator, Not Another Constitutional Law Course: A Proposal to Teach a Course on the
Constitution, 76 IOWA L. REV. 739 (1991).
9. [T]he mind needs teachers .... But there cannot be an infinite regress: ultimately
there must be teachers who are not in turn pupils. Those teachers who are not in turn
pupils are the great minds or, in order to avoid any ambiguity in a matter of such
importance, the greatest minds. Such men are extremely rare. We are not likely to
meet any of them in any classroom. We are not likely to meet any of them anywhere.
It is a piece of good luck if there is a single one alive in one's time. For all practical
purposes, pupils, of whatever degree of proficiency, have access to the teachers who are
not in turn pupils, to the greatest minds, only through the great books. Liberal
education will then consist in studying with the proper care the great books which the
greatest minds have left behind-a study in which the more experienced pupils assist
the less experienced pupils, including the beginners.
LEO STRAUSS, supra note 6, at 3.
10. Most theories of constitutional law rest on some notion of the consent of the
governed, either through tacit institutional acquiescence or through some kind of social
contract theory. A brilliant theory is by definition one that would not occur to most
people. It is hard to see how the vast majority of the population can be presumed to
have agreed to something that they could not conceive of. Who would know better than
the average person what the average person has consented to? How can someone have
consented to a position that is so novel and clever that only one person on earth has ever
thought of it?
Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917, 924 (1986).
11. Professor Rotunda also is a coauthor of one of the leading case books in legal ethics.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & THOMAS MORGAN, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
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is the casebook that is the subject of this review, one of the few
casebooks edited solo voce. 12  Then he is a coauthor of the best
hornbook on the subject. 3 He also is a coauthor of the only multi-
volume treatise covering the whole field of constitutional law.'4 He
has been cited by the Supreme Court.' And he is a professor's
professor in that his writings are cited so often by other academics. 6
He is a regular quote-meister in the national press.' 7 He even has his
very own homepage on the World Wide Web.'" The guy definitely
is a player at the national level. 9
BECOMING A MASTER TEACHER
What does it take to teach constitutional law to first-year law
students? Probably only a good casebook and a teacher's manual.2"
RESPONSIBILITY (6th ed. 1995). He is a prominent scholar in that field, as well.
12. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1997).
13. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1995).
See also ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (1997);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). See generally Earl M.
Maltz, Trust Betrayed, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (1983) (book review); William F. Swindler,
Constitutional Law, 10 N. M. L. REV. 223 (1979-80) (book review); James W. Torke, A Look at
the Constitutional Law Texts, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 688 (1981) (book review).
14. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1992). Upon first being published, this work was hailed as the "first definitive account
of constitutional law in nearly 100 years." 60 FLA. B. J., Apr. 1986, at 88. See generally Ralph
A. Rossum, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, 4 CONST. COMMENTARY
409 (1987) (review of first edition).
15. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 117 S. Ct. 1636, 1649 (1997); Morse v. Republican Party
of Virginia, 517 U.S. 186, 199 (1996); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 904,
917 (1995); R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 156 (1986); Florida
Dept. HRS v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 153 (1981); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 575 (1980); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 483 (1975).
16. A LEXIS search on August 31, 1997, in the database Lawrev/Allrev, scored nine-
hundred hits on "Ronald D. Rotunda."
17. A LEXIS search on August 31, 1997, in the databases News/Curnws and
News/Arcnws, respectively, scored 189 and 239 hits on "Ronald pre/3 Rotunda and professor
or 'supreme court' or constitution."
18. <http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/-rrotunda/> (That he has a sense of humor is illustrated
by the fact that his "official photograph" depicts him standing next to Mr. Spock from the U.S.S.
Enterprise).
19. Indeed, that he is an international player is demonstrated by the fact that he has served
as an adviser to several emerging democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union on
their constitutions. See <http://www.staff.uiuc.edu/~Errotunda/bio.html>.
20. In the generation I have been teaching, teacher's manuals have become de rigueur. See
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW THIRTEENTH EDITION (1997) (first edition of a teacher's manual published for the
thirteenth edition of the case book).
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I am a devout heresiarch against modernity,21 especially when it
comes to the modern educational theory that reigns on college
campuses." Technology and multimedia mostly get in the way of
teaching and learning." I am convinced beyond peradventure that
the best education in constitutional law would be Ron Rotunda on one
end of the log and a student on the other.24 Sitting opposite his
casebook is the next best thing for my students. I still believe in
books.2" That brings us to the consideration of what makes a good
casebook and why I believe Professor Rotunda's case book is a such a
good one.
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
My story with Professor Rotunda's book begins in the spring of
1981, when I first taught Constitutional Law. My book choice came
down to Gunther26 versus Lockhart27 and I chose Lockhart, mainly
because it was the book my teacher and mentor, Fletcher N. Baldwin,
Jr., used to teach my first-year course back when I was a law student
at the University of Florida. What was good enough for Moses was
good enough for me.2 As a professor, I spent two years trying to
21. "Most new ideas are bad.. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, CRISIS
AND REFORM 195-96 (1985).
22. Cf. D. L. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, SCIENCE, Jan. 1973, at 250.
23. The constitutional law exception which proves this rule may be Professor Bell's effort
to reinvent the casebook, recently published by Anderson Press. DERRICK A. BELL, JR.,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS (1997). Part I is a five-hundred page book between two covers
that combines a hornbook summary of the law with a workbook of hypotheticals; Part II is a set
of disks containing a searchable database of the relevant judicial opinions in edited form. This
is a most promising prototype. CD-ROM and HTML technologies already are evolving the
traditional casebook. A common problem with some of the amateurish, home-made materials I
have seen, however, is that they overload the teacher and the student with a deluge of cases and
articles. I also agree with the criticism that hyper-text technology is better-suited for research
than for writing and reading. Humans do not think the way hyper-text works. See David Shenk,
Hyper-Text Has Disadvantages (National Public Radio, Morning Edition, May 14, 1997).
24. "The ideal college was Mark Hopkins on one end of the log and a student on the
other." FREDERICK RUDOLPH, MARK HOPKINS AND THE LOG: WILLIAMS COLLEGE FROM
1836 TO 1872 27 (1956). This quotation is sometimes attributed to President James A. Garfield,
who was one of Hopkins' students.
25. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE REPUBLIC OF LETTERS 56-76 (1989).
26. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed.
1997).
27. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed. 1996).
28. Every good teacher is first and always a student of his subject who, in turn, has
many teachers. I have been fortunate, indeed, to have had so many great teachers, both
inside and outside the classroom. My own constitutional vocation began when one of
my teachers, Professor Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., called on a nervous though prepared
first-year law student to recite on Marbury v. Madison. I never got over it, as is
evidenced by this book, which I dedicate to all my teachers. May they find it worthy
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overcome the size and scope of that book, which is to say more about
me than about the book: in a four-hour, required, first-year, survey
course, Gunther and Lockhart are just overwhelming. The third year,
I reexamined the available books and switched to Rotunda29 and I
have been using it ever since. This spring semester 1998, I will use
the Fifth Edition.3
The reasons I first chose the Rotunda casebook are the same
reasons I have been so loyal to the Rotunda brand name over the years.
I assign the Preface to my students to read for the first class session,
and I explain to them that Professor Rotunda's purposes parallel my
own goals for our course together. I want a book that is effective at
"introducing and exposing students to the underlying principles of
constitutional law."'" I want them to develop "a sound understanding
of the basic principles." 32 I want to impart to them "a sense of where
the law is moving."33 And I firmly believe that "it is better to know
a few things well than to know many things superficially." 34 Finally,
in my course, "[t]he emphasis is on modern constitutional law."' 3' For
the last sixteen years, over five editions and his timely and useful
supplements,36 Professor Rotunda has delivered on these promises.
The chief distinguishing attribute of the Rotunda casebook is its
compactness. The Fifth Edition runs fewer than 1200 pages; the book
has not grown much over the years.37 This is an unusual level of
discipline in our subject, considering the size of some of the leading
competitors. For example, Gunther and Lockhart both run nearly one-
third longer. Constitutional law casebooks seem to resemble the old
Hungarian saying that "if some is good, more is better." Of course,
less is not necessarily better. What is remarkable about Professor
Rotunda's casebook is that he manages to include all the important
cases yet preserves a fuller set of opinions to guarantee "thoughtful
classroom discussion .... Socratic dialogue . . . a genuine feeling for
of their inspiration.
THOMAS E. BAKER, THE MOST WONDERFUL WORK--OUR CONSTITUTION INTERPRETED
iii (1996).
29. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed. 1981).
30. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 1997).





36. See, e.g., RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 1997 SUPPLEMENT TO MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW FIFTH EDITION (1997).
37. ROTUNDA, supra note 30, at v ("The original edition was only 1025 pages long. This
edition is only about 150 pages longer.") Id.
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the case."3 He accomplishes this primarily by slighting tracts of the
tenure track, that is, professorial writings. This is praiseworthy.
39
He also avoids those endless-and endlessly annoying-notes after the
cases replete with tons of citations to obscure cases. As an aside, it has
always been a small curiosity of mine that in the early parts of the
casebook, Professor Rotunda commits some venial sins in these
regards, but he avoids their near occasion in the later chapters. It is
almost as if he started writing a typical casebook and then had an
inspiration toward a more elegant rendition of the subject. Perhaps he
wrote the first chapters here in the United States and when he got to
Italy, where he finished the casebook, he did not have the materials to
include the ordinary minutiae.40 Whatever the explanation, I offer
tribute to his muses.
This is the real strength of Professor Rotunda's book: "a novice
teacher and a veteran teacher can use it profitably."4" I began using
it when I was an apprentice and I continue to use it now that I am a
long-standing member of the constitutional guild."
38. ROTUNDA, supra note 30, at xiv.
39. "[L]aw reviews are to law what masturbation is to sex." Baker, supra note 2, at 712.
40. See ROTUNDA, supra note 30, at v.
41. Candor, and not immodesty, obliges me to reveal that I furnished the following
promotional blurb:
I have used all four previous editions of Rotunda and my "brand loyalty" is stronger
than ever for the Fifth Edition. It is eminently user-friendly, i.e., for the teacher and
the student. The case selection is excellent. The editing supports Socratic dialogue.
The notes do not get in the way. This is still an old-fashioned casebook, not a
hornbook masquerading as one. The students appreciate the parallel to West's Nowak
& Rotunda hornbook, which I recommend alongside. A novice and a veteran teacher
can use it profitably.
Letter from Lisa Dittmann, West Publishing Company, to Constitutional Law Professors (Apr.
8, 1997) (on file with the author).
42. This is the place to note the other books that I have used over the years in teaching
various advanced courses in Constitutional Law: DONALD L. DOERNBERG & C. KEITH
WINGATE, FEDERAL COURTS, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS (1994); QUARRELS
THAT HAVE SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION (John A. Garraty ed. 1987); JOHN H. GARVEY &
FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER (2d ed. 1996); CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY-ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (Michael J. Gerhardt & Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., eds.,
1993); MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY-THE COLONIAL ERA
THROUGH RECONSTRUCTION (Kermit L. Hall, ed. 1992); MAJOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICA
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY-FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT (Kermit L. Hall, ed., 1992); THE
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham, ed., 1986);
A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION-ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
(Jules Lobel, ed., 1988); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS (9th ed. 1992);
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM (1985); WALTER F. MURPHY, ET AL.,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 1995); THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
(Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961); WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1995);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
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THE HONORS SECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Briefly, what follows is how I use Professor Rotunda's casebook
to teach my course. 43 I teach a required, first-year course each spring
semester. Given the severe limitation of four credit hours, I ignore the
catalogue's comprehensive description." I cover the chapters on
Judicial Review, Due Process, State Action, Equal Protection, and
Freedom of Speech. This is a little over 700 pages in the casebook.
I omit the chapters on Implied Powers, State and Federal Powers under
the Commerce Clause, President and Congress, Religion, and
Constitutional Litigation. Some of these themes come up indirectly,
however. For example, we discuss the Commerce Clause power in the
context of the state police power under the Due Process Clause. For
another example, we discuss separation of powers in the context of the
political question doctrine under the power of judicial review.
Throughout the course, I emphasize the leitmotif of constitutional
interpretation, how judges and lawyers go about the task of giving
meaning to the Constitution. Some of the omitted topics come into
play in those discussions and exercises, as well. For example, early in
the semester, we consider the interpretive question, "May a woman
serve as President of the United States?
4
Thus, my syllabus is decidedly prejudiced in favor of individual
rights. I do not follow the traditional organization of the course and
the casebooks-including the Rotunda casebook-to begin with judicial
review and then to go into separation of powers and federalism before
considering individual rights. This is justifiable pragmatically because
individual rights issues are the constitutional issues my students are
most likely to encounter in the practice of law. I submit that this is
justifiable theoretically, as well. Like all God's Commandments, all
constitutional principles can be reduced to two essential inquiries, and
one is primary over the other. All constitutional issues involve either
43. Of course, there are many ways to teach constitutional law and I have tried several
myself. See generally George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., The Teaching of Constitutional Law in American
Law Schools, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 38 (1981) (survey of law schools).
44. Constitutional Law 5001. 4 hrs. A study of the federal judiciary's doctrine and
practice of judicial review, judicial power, and jurisdiction of the courts, the power of
Congress to regulate commerce, the power of the states to regulate commerce, and the
protection of private rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution which
includes the substantive rights of freedom of enterprise, freedom of expression, freedom
of religion, and freedom from discrimination.
BULLETIN OF TExAs TECH. UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF LAW CATALOGUE 1997-98 at 13.




an inquiry into government organization and power or an inquiry into
individual liberty versus government power,46 but the individual
liberty inquiry always should come first.47  Therefore, that is the
inquiry with which my course and my students and I myself have been
preoccupied, them for fifteen weeks each spring and me for fifteen
years each week.
Over the years, I have prepared worksheets for each chapter,
which I distribute before we begin the chapter. The worksheets
contain reading suggestions in the leading hornbooks and in the
secondary literature, hypotheticals for in-class and out-of-class
discussion, and questions for further review. Each worksheet includes
additional attachments for out-of-class reading that vary every year.
These attachments deal with current constitutional events, the Justices
and the Court, and law school life. A set of my worksheets is
reproduced as the Appendix to this Article.
I also require my students to buy and read David O'Brien's
excellent book Storm Center.8 It is The Brethren with footnotes.49
But it is more than that. It gives the students an insider's look at the
Supreme Court and fills critical gaps in undergraduate studies in
history and political science."0 I tell them to read it like a novel.
Someone who went to law school when I did would not find my
classroom remarkable. Moderns would complain about all the
illegitimate hierarchy. For example, I do not allow students to wear
46. JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A NUTSHELL 34 (1979).
Regrettably, the case discussion-but not the basic analysis-in this book has become dated. I
used to assign it as required reading.
47. It is not analytically sound to consider the organization of the federal government
and its relationship to the state governments before considering the constitutional
aspects of individual liberty because constitutional questions concerning the protection
of individual liberty arise in all constitutional cases, including those allocating
governmental power to the national government or the state governments. So any
analysis of the cases involving the distribution of powers between the states and federal
government postpones the fundamental inquiry contained in all such cases as to whether
either government has the power to engage in the regulatory activity involved, or
whether, on the other hand, neither the state governments nor the national government
can regulate because such regulation would interfere with individual liberty.
Id. at 35-36.
48. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER-THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (4th ed. 1996).
49. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN-INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT (1979).
50. See generally David P. Bryden, Teaching Constitutional Law: Homage to Clio, 1 CONST.
COMMENTARY 131 (1984) (testing law students' knowledge of constitutional history); William
H. Rehnquist, A Comment on the Instruction of Constitutional Law, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 563 (1987)
(commenting on the need to understand history and the Supreme Court as an institution).
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hats; indeed, my first posted assignment bears the legend, "No
hats." And I call on students using the Socratic method to lead
them in a Musgrave ritual12 beginning with the three questions Chief
Justice Marshall asked and answered in Marbury v. Madison, 3 et
cetera, et cetera, et cetera, amen. I have varied this from time to time
to administer a sign-up system for reciting on cases most frequently at
the end of the semester when so many deadlines are falling down
around my students' heads. We also go through various exercises,
including some trendy role-playing exercises in which individual
students try to understand and predict how and why an individual
Justice will vote on a realistic hypothetical.5 4
Consistent with our law school's formal policy, I take into account
a student's preparation and performance in class for a one-grade up-or-
down adjustment in his or her course grade (actual examples, B+ raised
to an A or a D lowered to an F). Most professors at my law school
announce this in terrorem but do not follow through. I do follow
through and it is part of my reputation. After all, I announce the first
day of classes that mine is the honors section.
This up-or-down adjustment also is based on unannounced
quizzes, which I think are very beneficial. Here is how they work. I
walk into class and announce we are having a quiz, so the students
should close their books and take out a sheet of paper. The question
is based on the day's reading. Sometimes it is the question I left them
with at the end of the previous class meeting. I state the question and
repeat it once. The questions are focused and specific; the emphasis
is on the "Rule" in the "Issue-Rule-Analysis-Conclusion" IRAC
sequence.55  They have ten minutes to write an answer. They put
51. Dear Miss Manners,
Would you kindly find out for me the background and reason why hats should not
be worn by males in a room of people, e.g., a classroom. Since I teach law, I've had to
relax the rule, as students would like a reason for it.
Dear Gentle Reader,
Miss Manners knows those law students. God bless them, they want a practical
justification for every rule. There isn't one. Hats are as symbolic as the judge's robes
they hope one day to wear.
JUDITH MARTIN, MISS MANNERS RESCUES CIVILIZATION FROM SEXUAL HARASSMENT,
FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS, DISSING AND OTHER LAPSES IN CIVILITY 47-48 (1996).
52. A. CONAN DOYLE, THE ILLUSTRATED SHERLOCK HOLMES TREASURY 235 (1984).
53. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
54. See Paul Gewirtz, The Jurispnuence of Hypotheticals, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120 (1982).
55. Questions vary from year to year, of course, but here are some illustrative examples
from early in the semester:
What does the Constitution say about "judicial review"?
What are "advisory opinions" and what is the Supreme Court's position on them?
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their name on the paper and pass it in. I take the quizzes home and
grade them, with the same three categories as the grade adjustment
policy ("+" or "0" or "-"). Often I write comments to explain the
point of the quiz and to respond to the individual answer. My
secretary records the grades and I hand back the papers at the next
class meeting. Over the semester I administer between ten and fifteen
quizzes. At the end of the semester, I award the plus or minuses
based on the quizzes and the notes of in-class participation I make on
my seating charts. Usually, the semester compilations describe a
slightly-skewed bell-shaped curve with about twenty percent pluses,
ten percent minuses, and seventy percent no adjustments.
The only costs of this technique are the lost class time, which
totals at most only two or three class meetings over the semester, and
the grading time, which amounts to two or three hours for each quiz.
The benefits far outweigh the costs. In effect, I manage to "call on"
every student to recite on the day's reading, which is far more fair than
calling on random students. It also provides students with personal
feedback. Students benefit from knowing sooner rather than later
whether what they are doing to learn the material is adequate, in
advance of the winner-take-all final examination, after which it is
simply too late to regroup or to seek help. They know, if they rack up
a series of minuses, that they should come talk to me. The quizzes
reward preparation and performance and reinforce professional work
habits. They have had the salutary by-product of toning up the overall
level of class preparation and participation.
The student's grade in my course is divided between a final
examination, worth 60% of his or her grade, and a group assignment,
worth 40%. The adjustment from class participation and quizzes is
applied to this grade. For the group assignment, I arrange the students
into Supreme Court panels of five members selected randomly. Each
panel is responsible for writing one majority opinion and one dissent-
ing opinion (no concurring opinions) in a Supreme Court case that is
pending during the current October Term. 6 Last spring semester,
for example, I assigned the companion cases dealing with the right to
physician-assisted suicide, Vacco v. Quill 7  and Washington v.
Define "property" for purposes of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
56. Recent past examples include United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). In other years, I have told the students to
imagine that he or she has a following of four other Justices who are prepared to overrule any
Supreme Court precedent, and then I assign each student the task of writing a draft opinion
overruling the offending precedent.
57. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
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Glucksberg.s8 The students are told about the on-line availability of
the briefs and the transcript of the oral argument on Westlaw and
Lexis."9 I furnish them the Preview of the case and a general
handout on opinion-writing.6
The group assignment is scheduled to be due after spring break
but before the intensity of the semester's end-game, usually during the
first week in March. I collect them at our regularly-scheduled class
meeting. One letter grade (for example, C lowered to D+) is deducted
from the group assignment grade for each day or fraction of a day it
is late, without regard to any explanation or excuse. The minimum
length of each opinion (majority and dissent) is ten pages, double-
spaced, and the maximum length is twenty pages.62 The instructions
require internal citation63 following A Uniform System of Citation,64
and I explicitly caution against plagiarism.65
I grade the group assignment by panel, that is, each panel member
receives the same grade, again worth approximately forty percent of
each student's course grade, subject only to the following administra-
tive adjustment to take into account what economists call the problem
of the free-rider. Any member of a panel may file a complaint with
me, in writing and signed by a second member of the same panel,
complaining that another panel member did substantially less than the
other members. Then I provide a copy of the complaint to the
affected student and request a written response. On the basis of these
written submissions, I decide whether or not to lower the group
assignment grade of the affected student by as much as two letter grade
increments (for example, C lowered to D+ or D). Complaints must
be filed on the due date of the group assignment.66 Finally, so that
58. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
59. (SCT-Briefs database) (Genfed/Briefs database).
60. E.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, "To Be or Not to Be": Will the Supreme Court Prescribe
Assisted Suicide?, PREVIEW OF U.S. SUP. CT. CAS., Issue No. 4, Dec. 23, 1996, at 243.
61. Dwight W. Stevenson, Writing Effective Opinions, 59 JUDICATURE 134 (1975).
62. See FED. R. APP. P. 32 (form of briefs and appendix).
63. I drop a footnote in the instructions to say "Footnotes are prohibited." See Abner J.
Mikva, For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1357, 1367 (1988) ("If footnotes were the
preferred mode of writing, Darwinian selection would have produced readers whose eyes are
placed on a vertical rather than horizontal plane.").
64. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (16th ed. 1996).
65. See generally Debbie Papay-Carder, Comment, Plagiarism in Legal Scholarship, 15 U.
TOL. L. REV. 233 (1983).
66. Over the years, there have been only two formal complaints. In one case, the complaint
process was the occasion for a student who was only going through the motions in all his classes
to decide to withdraw from law school. In the other case, I determined that the student was a
calculating free-rider and I imposed the two-grade penalty.
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all students will have equal access to the same information, I announce
that I will answer questions about the group assignment only during
plenary class sessions.
I am convinced that this research and writing assignment
contributes more to the student's mastery of our subject than anything
else I can assign, including the final examination.67 They are obliged
to work through the raw materials of the course-text, history,
tradition, precedent, philosophy, et cetera-toward a conclusion. They
must deal with a set of real facts with care and particularity.6' They
develop some sense of the responsibility of decision that the Justices
necessarily feel. They must work together like judges on collegial
courts-and like lawyers in a law firm for that matter-to go along and
get along. They develop a deeper understanding of the issue that
provides them with an appreciation for the depth of the subject. They
practice their research and writing skills, which are central to being a
good law student and a good lawyer. And the assignment is inherently
interesting to them as they anticipate the end-of-Term headlines.
The final component of a student's grade is my final examination.
Over the years, I have experimented with every type of examination
technique and several combinations of them: closed-book and open-
book exams, in-class and take-home exams, essay questions, short-
answer questions, and multiple-choice questions. In recent years, I
have relied on multiple-choice questions. This technique allows me to
be comprehensive; a three-hour examination of one hundred questions
on thirty-four pages achieves considerable coverage and depth. This
is the way that the subject of constitutional law is tested on all fifty
state bar examinations. This generation of students has grown up with
multiple-choice tests. Indeed, to be admitted to law school in the first
place they have had to succeed on the Law School Admissions Test.
Anyone who says a multiple-choice examination is a lazy way out
is someone who has never put together a good one. To develop a bank
of good questions is a great deal of hard work. And a good teacher is
always on the lookout for new questions, always noodling on the old
questions, always moving and shifting questions around. It helps to
start with some questions in the bank. A beginner can obtain sets of
other professors' multiple-choice questions through the Institute for
67. See generally Philip C. Kissam, Teaching Constitutional Law Differently, 9 CONST.
COMMENTARY 237 (1992) (describing a research and writing regimen).
68. See generally David P. Bryden, Teaching Constitutional Law: An Eye for the Facts, 1
CONST. COMMENTARY 225 (1984) (emphasizing the need for careful factual analysis).
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Law School Teaching.6 9 I developed my own bank of questions by
sitting down with the Rotunda casebook, my class notes, handouts, and
the hornbook. I keep a file for collecting ideas from all sorts of
sources-cases, law reviews, discussion lists, newspapers, and
magazines. I am convinced of the overall reliability and validity of this
testing technique for evaluating my students' mastery of our subject,
in large part, by the fact that the reliability coefficient on my test runs
so high.7°  Anything over +0.5 is a good value. Mine run much
higher. Last spring semester it was +0.811.
In combination-calling on students, giving unannounced quizzes,
assigning a group paper, and administering a multiple-choice final
examination-I evaluate each student in terms of his or her mastery of
our subject. Besides my own teaching, inside and outside the
classroom, the casebook is the single most important resource for
achieving this mastery. That is why finding a casebook that facilitates
this mastery in synchrony with the teacher is essential. That is why
I remain so loyal to the Rotunda casebook.
A POSTSCRIPT
Mastering constitutional law is a daunting challenge for teacher
and student alike. But that is exactly what makes it so great for
teacher and student alike. If everyone could do it, it would not be so
great.7  That Professor Rotunda respectfully understands this
challenge and has successfully mastered it is demonstrated by his
excellent casebook.
72
69. Questions are available for all subjects. Various limitations apply to particular sets of
questions. Write the Institute for Law School Teaching, Gonzaga University, School of Law,
P.O. Box 3528, Spokane, Washington 99220-3528 or call (509) 328-4220, extension 3740.
70. For a textbook explanation of reliability and validity in testing, see generally ANNE
ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 109-62 (7th ed. 1988). See also LEARNING &
EVALUATION IN LAW SCHOOL, VOLUME 1, PRINCIPLES IN TESTING & GRADING, LEARNING
THEORY, INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES (Michael Josephson ed., 1984).
71. In the movie A League of Their Own, Tom Hanks's character, manager Jimmy Dugan,
is arguing with his star player, played by Geena Davis, who is quitting the team to go back home
because playing the sport is "too hard." Dugan growls, "It's supposed to be hard. If it wasn't
hard, everyone would do it. The hard is what makes it great." A LEAGUE OF THEIR OWN
(Columbia Pictures Corp. 1992).
72. Like much of legal scholarship, book reviews often are undertaken more to be
written than to be read. But reviewing a book obliges the reviewer to do more than read
what the author has written. Writing a review-like writing a book in the first place-is
the most rigorous form of thinking about your subject. Making the effort to put down
your thoughts about a book is a compliment to the book and the book's author.




What follows are the five 'Worksheets' that I distributed in the spring
semester 1997 to my first-year students. They are keyed to the Fourth
Edition of the Rotunda casebook. The Worksheets contain reading
suggestions in the leading hornbooks and in the secondary literature,
hypotheticals for in-class and out-of-class discussion, and questions for
further review. Each of these handouts carries additional attachments for
out-of-class reading-short articles gathered from various newspapers,
magazines, and on-line source-dealing with current constitutional events,
the Supreme Court and the Justices, or law school life. The attachments
change from year to year.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WORKSHEET NO. 1
Chapter 1. Judicial Review
1-1. The Origins
1. "Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the lawgiver, to all intents and
purposes, and not the person who first spoke or wrote them."
Bishop Hoadly's Sermon, preached before the King, 1717.
2. What was your reaction to reading the Constitution of the United
States? What structure is there in the articles? What functions
does a written constitution serve? Identify clauses that serve the
principles of separation of powers and federalism. What themes
have been developed in the 26 amendments? See generally
Thomas E. Baker and James E. Viator, Not Another Constitutional
Law Course; A Proposal to Teach a Course on the Constitution, 76
IOWA L. REV. 739 (1991).
3. Define judicial review.
4. How is judicial review justified? What are some arguments
against judicial review?
5. The best single treatment of Marbury v. Madison (1) is William
W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L.J. 1.
6. Is the Court's statement of its own power in Cooper v. Aaron (8)
truly a statement of settled doctrine? What does this decision add
to Marbury v. Madison (1)? How is it justified? What is the
Court's motive?
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7. Consider and review the notes at 10-13. Always make an effort
to understand Professor Rotunda's questions and think about how
you would answer him.
8. Compare the institutional capacities for constitutional interpreta-
tion of Congress, the President, the Supreme Court, and state
supreme courts.
9. What is "original intent"? How does the role and power of the
Court change with the definition given this term and the impor-
tance afforded to this concept?
10. What style of constitutional decision-making characterizes an
interpretivist approach? A process-oriented approach? A value-
oriented approach? As we go through the course, try to categorize
the Justices through their opinions.
11. "Today, as has been true since the earliest days of our Republic,
before a federal court may deign to decide, the case or controversy
must be determined to fall both within the Article III empower-
ment and within some particular enabling act of Congress."
Thomas E. Baker, Thinking About Federal Jurisdiction--of Serpents
and Swallows, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 239, 240 (1986). What does
this mean? What did it mean in 1816 in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee (13)?
12. Consider and review the questions at 21-25.
13. Describe the relationship between the Supreme Court and the
highest court of a state for interpreting federal and state law.
What is "independent"? "Adequate"? How does federalism
inform the inquiry? What are the special problems of the
ambiguously grounded state court decision? How does Michigan
v. Long (23) try to solve them? What are the different approaches
to reconciling state constitutional law with the power of judicial
review under the federal constitution? If Justice Stevens' dissent
were followed, how would these relationships and approaches
change? What should be the proper role of the Supreme Court?
See generally Thomas E. Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and
Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a
Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799 (1985).
14. Consider Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), in which the
Court unremarkably held that the Connecticut legislature had not
violated the Constitution when it set aside a probate decree. More
remarkable was the debate between Justices Chase and Iredell.
Justice Chase believed that the framers created limited state and
federal governments that were restricted by natural law and the
written documents. He saw the judicial role as enforcing
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nontextual, as well as textual, principles. Justice Iredell saw no
such role for the Court because enforcement of such principles
would subject the Constitution and the citizens to the personal
views of the Justice. Who was right? As we go through this
course, consider which position has been adopted, first, in form
and, second, in substance.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 1-21.
TRIBE at 23-66; 162-73.
Chapter 12. Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Review
12-1 Statutory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C.A.,
Chapter 81.
1. Consider and review the notes at 25-27.
2. Distinguish an appeal from a petition for a writ of certiorari.
What are the criteria for exercise of the Court's jurisdiction?
3. Distinguish the Court's original jurisdiction from its appellate
jurisdiction under Article III and the statutes.
12-2 Statutory Restrictions
1. Explain the Court's interpretation of the Congressional power
under the "with such exceptions" clause of Article III. How do
you reconcile Marbury v. Madison (1) with Ex parte McCardle
(27)?
2. Identify the competing views of Article III described in the notes
at 29-32.
3. For an informative account of constitutional difficulties raised by
bills considered by Congress to restrict federal jurisdiction, see
generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 22-44.
TRIBE at 42-61.
12-3 Advisory Opinions
1. How is the doctrine of separation of powers implicated in the
advisory opinion? What is the significance of the "judicial
power" definition in Article III in terms of "cases or controver-
sies"?
2. What are the policy objections to advisory opinions? How do
they apply to the facts in Muskrat v. United States (32)?
3. Consider and review the notes at 36-39.
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4. How is the advisory opinion rationale relevant to the independent
and adequate state ground doctrine?
5. What school of constitutional interpretation is exhibited in Ex
parte Young (38)?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 54-71.
TRIBE at 67-96; 173-95.
12-4 Political Questions
1. What is a political question?
2. Distinguish "federalism" from "separation of powers." Which is
relevant to nonjusticiability and how? Distinguish subject matter
jurisdiction and justiciability.
3. List the six categories of political questions and give one example
of each.
4. What important principle of nonjusticiability is added by Powell
v. McCormack (45)? Was the promise of judicial restraint made
in Baker v. Carr (39) broken in Powell?
5. How do you reconcile the principle of judicial review with the
principle of nonjusticiability (which seems to suggest that there
are provisions of the Constitution that the courts may not
independently interpret)?
6. Consider and review the notes at 50-55. Notice that Gilligan (50)
and Nixon (Supp.) are the only decisions since Baker was decided
in 1962 to hold an issue was nonjusticiable.
7. What is the relevance of the importance or nature of the issue
before the Court on the merits to the determination whether the
issue is a political question?
8. Suppose Congress passes and the President signs a bill to require
mandatory retirement for all members of Congress who will reach
the age of 70 years before the beginning of the next Congress.
Would the Court decide the constitutionality of the law? Cf.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, (204, 589) (upheld state requirement for
mandatory retirement of appointed judges).
9. Is the 27th Amendment constitutional? Can an amendment be
unconstitutional? See Article V.
10. What interpretive methodologies are being used in Nixon (Supp.)?






Chapter 6. Due Process.
6-1. Substantive Economic Due Process
1. Describe and explain the "Williams Diagram." See generally
JERRE S. WILLIAMS, CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN A NUT-
SHELL (1979).
2. What are the privileges and immunities of a citizen of the United
States? Of a citizen of a state?
3. How does the division of the Court in The Slaughter-House Cases
(339) follow the debate in Calder v. Bull (Worksheet No. 1,
question 14)?
4. To hold that corporations are "persons" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as the Court did in Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pacific Railway (344), what sort of interpretation methodology is
being used? See also Roe v. Wade (644).
5. Summarize the history of doctrine, i.e., the precedents, of the Due
Process Clause from 1873 to 1905 to 1934. How is the power of
judicial review in inverse relation to the legislative power? Is
there any difference in the role of the Court when reviewing acts
of state legislatures and the Congress?
6. Can you reconcile the language in Lochner v. New York (345) and
Nebbia v. New York (352)? Can you reconcile the outcomes in
these two cases?
7. Define "police power." Give examples. If there is no federal
police power, what clauses in the Constitution come close?
8. What is a so-called "Brandeis Brief'? Why was it an effective
tool of appellate advocacy? Would it be effective today?
9. Explain the "purpose-means" test and how it applies in modern
economic matters. How rigorous is the analysis? How can it
become more rigorous in the hands of a strong-willed jurist?
10. The Court will go to what lengths of analysis or "flights of fancy"
to uphold socioeconomic legislation? Why?
11. What role do political and social pressures play in Supreme Court
decision-making? Consider the discussion of the F.D.R. Court-
packing plan at 158-59. See also D. O'Brien at 92-121.
12. Is there an economic theory behind the modern due process
analysis? Does the Constitution contemplate a particular
economic theory? Which one? What role does or should the
Court have in preserving or changing that system?
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13. Most state constitutions contain a due process clause identical or
similar to the Fourteenth Amendment, but not all state supreme
courts have followed the federal Court's modern approach of
deference. E.g., Gillette Diary, Inc. v. Nebraska Dairy Products
Bd., 192 Neb. 89, 219 N.W.2d 214 (1974) (milk price control).
Recall the discussion of state constitutions in chapter one (21-25).
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 351-82.
TRIBE at 560-86.
6-2. A Note on the Incorporation of the Bill of Rights
1. Summarize the history of the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states. Draw a Williams diagram depicting that history.
2. How do the different theories of incorporation compare with the
more general theories of constitutional interpretation?
3. What are "fundamental rights"? How does the due process
analysis change for them?
4. Where does the Court find "nontextual rights"? How do we
know if they are fundamental?
5. What does the Ninth Amendment mean?
6. Distinguish a constitutional power from a constitutional right.
7. Is there a preference in the Constitution for political rights such
as free speech and an indifference toward important daily interests
such as food and shelter? What has happened to the freedom of
contract, once considered a fundamental part of Fourteenth
Amendment liberty?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 382-88.
TRIBE at 769-77.
6-3. The New Procedural Due Process
6-3.1 Defining "Liberty" and "Property"
1. Distinguish procedural due process from substantive due process.
How does the constitutional analysis change?
2. The test has changed from the "right v. privilege test" to the
"weight of the interest test" to the current two-step analysis.
Explain each. Has the law become more certain? More objective
and less dependent on the will of the Justices? Ask yourself if the
more recent cases would have been decided differently under the
two earlier versions.
3. How are substantive freedoms of the Bill of Rights affected, if at
all, by the procedural due process analysis?
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4. Define "property." Is it constitutionally created? What is the
constitutional threshold? Give some examples that you possess of
which the government might deprive you.
5. Define "liberty." Is it constitutionally created? What is the
constitutional threshold? Give some examples to which you are
entitled and of which the government might deprive you.
6. What is the constitutional policy or reason for the requirement of
procedural due process?
7. What sources might substantiate a claim of property? Liberty?
8. Given the importance of state law for defining property and
liberty, reconsider the role of the state court in Michigan v. Long
(23).
9. "It turns out, you see, that whether [the asserted interest is] a
property [or liberty] interest is a function of whether you're
entitled to it, which means the Court has to decide whether you're
entitled to it before it can decide whether you get a hearing on the
question whether you're entitled to it." John Hart Ely, Democracy
and Distrust 19 (1980).
10. Is there a constitutional definition of the word "life" in the Due
Process Clauses?
11. Does Joshua DeShaney have any constitutional rights? Does he
have any rights, at all? DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dept. of
Social Services (366).
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 487-524.
TRIBE at 663-706.
6-3.2 Determining What Process is Due
1. Reconcile Goldberg v. Kelly (366) with Mathews v. Eldridge (371).
What were the procedural safeguards that were required in the
former and not in the latter?
2. What is the constitutional analysis for determining whether a
notice is "adequate" and whether an opportunity to be heard is
"meaningful"?
3. "[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably inter-
twined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be
employed in determining that right, a litigant ... must take the
bitter with the sweet." Arnett v. Kennedy (1974) (plurality),
overruled by Cleveland Brd. of Education v. Loudermill (380).
What is wrong with the rejected approach?
4. Compare Justice Black's dissent in Goldberg v. Kelly (370) with
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Cleveland Brd. of Education v.
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Loudermill (384). How do the respective majorities answer their
criticism?
5. What do the note cases at 376-80 add to our understanding of the
constitutional adequacy of procedure?
6. "Although one may disagree with the results in [cases decided by
juggling the three factors in Mathews v. Eldridge], the Court's
open analysis of the values at stake ... and its attempt to
accommodate the competing values of liberty and efficient
administrative procedures certainly is preferable to the masking of
such decisions through vaguely worded opinions or formalistic
interpretations of constitutional provisions." John E. Nowak,
Foreword-Due Process Methodology in the Postincorporation
World, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 397, 403 (1979). How consistent
and predictable, however, are the Court's holdings?
7. Suppose a state initiated an ombudsman system in which every
citizen complaint about her treatment by any government agency
would be independently investigated for accuracy and fairness
and, if appropriate, the outcome changed by an ombudsman
order. Suppose this system was the exclusive method for
challenging all such actions. Would the state have to do even
more? Does the Constitution require this? Should it?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 524-67.
TRIBE at 706-68.
6-4. Bills of Attainder
1. What are the various tests to determine when a statute is a bill of
attainder? What are the implications for the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers? Do you see an analogy here to the doctrine of
nonjusticiability?
2. How particular must a statute be to violate the Bill of Attainder
Clause? What are prohibited "punishments" under the clause:
historically, functionally, and motivationally?
3. Is a ban on the practice of medicine by convicted felons a
constitutional regulatory measure or an unconstitutional bill of
attainder? Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
4. Compare the bill of attainder analysis with the traditional equal
protection analysis and the review of substantive economic due
process. Review the bill of attainder analysis against the so-called
strict scrutiny applied to "suspect classifications" and "fundamen-
tal rights."
5. Consider the constitutionality of a statute that denied federal
higher-education financial assistance to male students who did not
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register for the draft. Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984).
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 420-23.
TRIBE at 641-43.
6-5. Impairment of Contracts
1. How is Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus (394) foreshadowed
in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (391)? What
explains the "desuetude" of the clause between 1934 and 1978?
Could a similar renaissance occur in substantive economic due
process? Should it?
2. What theory of interpretation does Chief Justice Hughes follow
in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell (391)? Compare
the methodology in Justice Brennan's dissent in Allied Structural
Co. v. Spannaus (398).
3. How and why does the Contract Clause analysis, applicable to
state legislation, differ from the due process analysis, applicable to
federal legislation?
4. How and why does the contract analysis change from private
contracts to government contracts?
5. Consider the questions at 399-401.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 394-407.
TRIBE at 607-28.
6-6. The Taking of Property
6-6.1 Taking By Possession
1. United States v. Causby (401). How does the Court reconcile
common law property doctrine with the Takings Clause? What
is the measure of just compensation?
2. Consider and review the notes at 404-07. Articulate the differ-
ence between the majority and the concurring justices in National
Board of YMCA v. United States (404). Compare Kaiser Aetna
v. United States (405) with PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins
(406).
3. See generally Thomas E. Baker & Robert E. Wood, Jr., "Taking"
a Constitutional Look at the State Bar of Texas Proposal to Collect
Interest on Attorney- Client Trust Accounts, 14 TEX. TECH L. REV.
327 (1983).
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
6-6.2 Taking by Regulation
1. How much does the Takings Clause diminish the state police
power? Compare the Contract Clause analysis. Compare the
limit imposed by substantive economic due process.
2. How does the Court analyze zoning restrictions and property use
regulations under the Takings Clause? If the analysis is "ad hoc"
and "factual," what are some of the factors considered?
3. How much of the holding in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (407)
survives the plurality's holding in Moore v. City of East Cleveland
(409)?
4. Why does the Court tolerate such paradoxes in principles of
taking: damaging private property may be a taking, but some
instances of total destruction do not require compensation;
regulation generally does not require compensation, but a
regulation may be so restrictive that it amounts to a taking.
5. When a regulation constitutes a taking by eliminating the
economic value of property, is it a sufficient remedy for the
government to rescind the regulation or should the government be
required to compensate the owner for the diminished value of the
property for the period between enactment of the regulation and
the judicial finding that a taking occurred?
6. In takings cases, consider four factors: (1) Has the government
physically used or occupied a citizen's property? (2) To what
extent has the value of the property been diminished? (3) Balance
the individual's loss against the public gain. (4) Has the individu-
al's liberty been restricted beyond some limit on activity harmful
to others?
7. Consider the notes at 409-13. What, if any, trend do you discern
in the more recent Takings Clause decisions?
8. If you want an insight into what the current Justices think is the
"modern constitutional law," take a look at Concrete Pipe &
Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S. Ct.
2264, 2289-92 (1993).






Chapter 7. State Action
See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 452-86.
TRIBE at 1688-1720.
7-1. Introduction
1. Explain the state action analysis in the triangle of "alleged
wrongdoer," "aggrieved party," and "government."
2. Of the three Civil War amendments, which require state action
and why? Consider what the state action doctrine means for the
respective roles of Congress and the Supreme Court in interpret-
ing and enforcing these provisions.
3. How is the state action doctrine derivative of the various substan-
tive constitutional doctrines to which it applies, i.e., is the state
action doctrine nothing more than an alternative way of formulat-
ing the substantive doctrines?
4. Can you imagine what the Constitution would be like without a
state action doctrine? Suppose, for example, that a constitutional
amendment prohibited private racial discrimination. Would it be
enough to make the provision merely hortatory? Does every
constitutional right require some government enforcement?
Would the amendment imply a command to government to
respond affirmatively in some way to private discrimination?
5. What theory of federalism comes through Justice Bradley's
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases (414)? Reconsider the modern
state action cases in terms of the diminished role of federalism
today.
6. Can state action theory be reconciled with a theory of individual
rights to equate individual liberty with the absence of government
power so that judicially enforced constitutional limitations should
not reach certain private conduct? Reconsider the modern state
action cases in terms of this theory of individual rights.
7-2. The Public Function
1. Define the public function doctrine. Give some examples of
functions on the private side and on the public side of the
doctrine. Are there objective constitutional standards for drawing
the line? For placing a particular activity on one side or the
other?
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
2. How is precedent used and abused in this line of cases? How
much should stare decisis mean in constitutional interpretation?
3. Are these decisions better recast to say that in some matters
government may not constitutionally leave certain decisions to
private actors?
4. Identify the government actor behind the alleged wrongdoer in
each of these cases.
5. Apply the state action triangulation analysis to Cousins v. Wigoda
(430).
6. Reconsider whether a private university is a company town and,
if so, for what purposes.
7-3. Court Enforcement of Private Agreements
1. Can Shelley v. Kraemer (432) be read so broadly as to hold that
any judicial decree that disadvantages a member of a racial
minority or the exercise of a fundamental right is state action and,
therefore, violates the Fourteenth Amendment? Has it been read
so broadly? Should it be?
2. Consider the questions at 434. How are the questions on the
merits related to the threshold state action issue?
3. How do you reconcile Evans v. Newton (434) with Evans v. Abney
(436)? Was there a way to decide the former so that the latter
case would not arise? What did these two decisions do to the
doctrine in Shelley v. Kraemer?
4. Suppose an individual homeowner observes that two persons, one
white and one black, walk across his property on a regular basis.
Pursuant to state law, the owner posts on the property "No
Trespassing" yet both continue to trespass, even after personal
warnings. Suppose the owner, motivated solely by racial discrimi-
nation, files a complaint against only the black trespasser who is
prosecuted under a neutral and otherwise constitutional trespass
statute. Does the black defendant have a constitutional defense?
Cf. Whitney v. California (729) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(discussing incitement to trespass).
7-4. Symbiotic and Financial Relationships
1. "[S]ifting the facts and weighing the circumstances," what details
of a relationship between government and an alleged wrongdoer
render the latter the constitutional alter ego of the former?
2. What does the Court mean to say in Norwood v. Harrison (443):
[A]lthough the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places
no value on discrimination. . . . Invidious private discrimination
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may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association
protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded
affirmative constitutional protections....
3. How much of this state action theory survives Rendell-Baker v.
Cohn (444) and Blum v. Yaretsky (444), both decided the same
day?
4. When a public defender acts as an attorney, she is not a state
actor; when a public defender acts as an employer, she is a state
actor. Can you reconcile these holdings?
5. Consider what Justice Scalia once observed about "totality of the
circumstances" tests in constitutional law:
Today's decision ... extends into the very heart of our most signifi-
cant constitutional function the "totality of the circumstances" mode
of analysis that this Court has in recent years become fond of...
This is not analysis; it is ad hoc judgment. . . . The ad hoc
approach to constitutional adjudication has real attraction, even apart
from its work-saving potential. It is guaranteed to produce a result,
in every case, that will make a majority of the Court happy with the
law. The law is, by definition, precisely what the majority thinks,
taking all things into account, it ought to be.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733-34 (1988).
7-5. Licensing
1. What notion of causation do these cases add to state action
theory? How and when is it satisfied? Is causation always a
factor in the state action analysis?
2. How are these cases true to the analysis of The Civil Rights Cases
(414)? Was Justice Harlan's dissent there the better path not
chosen?
3. When may the Court conceptually isolate and then surgically
remove an offending state action to protect the otherwise private
nature of an alleged wrongdoer? Reconsider the quotation, supra,
from Norwood v. Harrison (443).
4. Why is the Court willing to distinguish among private actors,
limited-purpose state actors and all-purpose state actors? What,
if anything, would be lost by eliminating the middle category?
5. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (448) Justice Marshall
dissents and observes: "The Court has not adopted the notion,
accepted elsewhere, that different standards should apply to state
action analysis when different constitutional claims are presented."
Is he correct?
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7-6. State Nonfinancial Facilitation of Private Acts
1. Consider the following possible descriptions of the holding in
Reitman v. Mulkey (450). Which are consistent with the plurali-
ty's opinions? Which are explicitly or implicitly disavowed?
Which best justifies the holding under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment? Which are consistent with prior case law not questioned
or overruled by the Reitman Court? Which are consistent with
subsequent decisions in this area?
(1) The state has an affirmative duty to prevent private discrimi-
nation under some circumstances;
(2) A state may not authorize private discrimination;
(3) A state may not encourage private discrimination;
(4) Once a state has prohibited private discrimination, it may not
backtrack;
(5) A state may not disable its agencies and subdivisions from
prohibiting private discrimination;
(6) State provisions that have the effect of disadvantaging a racial
minority demand an extraordinary justification, and neither
freedom of contract nor free association are a sufficient
justification.
2. Would the holding in Anderson v. Martin (455) extend to a state
voting regulation that required a candidate to indicate on the
ballot the candidate's membership in any political party? What
about gender?
3. How would Justice Powell reconcile Washington v. Seattle School
District No. 1 (455) with Crawford v. Board of Education (458)?
Would any other Justice agree? Would you?
4. After Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks (460) and Lugar v. Edmondson
Oil Co., Inc. (462) can you draft a self-help repossession statute
in the law of sales, U.C.C. Article 2, that would not be state
action or, if the Constitution applied, would be upheld? Take
another look at the procedural due process cases (376-78).
5. Is the state action analysis "[ilnevitabl[y] bankrupt" as Professor
Tribe suggests? See Thomas E. Baker & Robert E. Wood, Jr.,
"Taking" a Constitutional Look at the State Bar of Texas Proposal
to Collect Interest on Attorney-Client Trust Accounts, 14 TEX.
TECH L. REv. 327, 336-39 (1983).
6. Can you reconcile Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. (463)
with the holdings in Polk County v. Dodson (445) and Branti v.
Finkel (445)? Reconsider the implications of Edmonson after we
study suspect classifications and fundamental rights.
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7-7. "Mirror Image" Cases
1. Explain how the state action doctrine serves the three constitu-
tional principles of individual liberty, federalism, and separation
of powers. To serve these principles, what cost do we extract
from the balanced side of individual liberty? Why not simply
acknowledge reality and perform a balancing analysis of the two
individual interests-the aggrieved party's right to be free from
the restraint involved versus the constitutional power of the
government to allow the alleged wrongdoer to be free to engage in
the conduct?
2. Where is the state action in San Francisco Arts & Athletics Inc. v.
U.S. Olympic Committee (904)?
3. Draw a Williams diagram of state action theory in the so-called
"mirror image" cases. Is this surreal modeling?
Is Professor Tribe much help?
If the usual premise is reversed-if the state action cases are
assumed not to reveal any general rule, and if the inquiry is
redirected to consider why this anarchy prevails-it is possible to
construct an "antidoctrine," an analytical framework which, in
explaining why various cases differ from one another, paradoxically
provides a structure for the solution of state action problems.
TRIBE at 1691.
Thus, if constitutional law is understood as a snapshot of the
deepest norms by which we govern our political lives, the state
action problem is its negative. It is a problem, or rather a series of
problems, whose solutions must currently be sought in perceptions
of what we do not believe particular constitutional provisions should
be read to control.
Id. at 1720. Will this be on the final examination?
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WORKSHEET NO. 4
Chapter 8. Equal Protection
See generally Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion:
A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 447 (1989); Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949).
8-1. Traditional Equal Protection
1. Distinguish among substantive due process, procedural due
process, and equal protection as alternate constitutional analyses.
2. From a judicial review orientation at deference to the legislative
process, how does equal protection compare to other constitutional
provisions?
3. Consider the logic of the "one step at a time" corollary. How
long can the government wait to take "the second step" before the
Constitution is violated? See Note, Reforming the One Step at a
Time Justification in Equal Protection Cases, 90 YALE L.J. 1777
(1981).
4. Is Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward (479) a return to the
Lochner era, a kind of "substantive equal protection"?
5. Why should a corporation be able to claim equal protection of the
law? Reconsider the question whether the Constitution presup-
poses any particular economic theory. Reconsider Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York (475) as a commercial speech case.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 568-90.
TRIBE at 143-651.
8-2. Suspect Classes and Other Classifications
8-2.1 Race
1. Distinguish between a facial challenge and an as-applied chal-
lenge. What problems of proof does each present?
2. Summarize the separate-but-equal doctrine and its demise.
Consider this development in the context of your understanding
of the proper methodology for interpreting the Constitution.
3. What is meant by "strict scrutiny" review? How is it applied?
4. Reconsider Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc. (463) as an
equal protection case.
5. With what impressions are you left of footnote 11 in Brown I at
489? Reconsider your reaction at the end of the course.
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6. Explain "reverse incorporation." Is this an example of legal
realism caricatured: make up your mind how you want the case
to come out and then think up some rationalization? Can this
concept be compared to finding the equivalent of the Contract
Clause in the Fifth Amendment or finding a variation of the
Takings Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment?
7. What are the constitutional powers of a federal court to order
equitable relief for a violation of the Constitution? What are the
limits, constitutional and nonconstitutional, on those powers?
8. Explain the distinction between de jure and de facto. Of what
significance is it today? How does it relate to state action theory?
What are the possible alternative approaches and what reasons has
the Court given for maintaining the distinction? What are some
of the problems with the Court's approach and with the alterna-
tives?
9. Bd. of Education v. Dowell (497), Freeman v. Pitts (498), and
United States v. Fordice (498) represent the last words from the
Supreme Court on school desegregation remedies. What comes
next?
10. If a state adopted a state constitutional amendment today with the
same provisions as the Alabama Constitution in Hunter v.
Underwood (511), how would the Court rule and why? Of what
relevance are the decisions on the fundamental right to vote?
11. Consider the different decisions on reverse discrimination. How
far has the Supreme Court majority moved from Regents of the
University of Cal. v. Bakke (512)?
12. Study Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (529). What does it mean for
the locus of power to remedy past discrimination and for federal-
ism? For separation of powers? What is your sense of the
Supreme Court's decisional momentum on affirmative action?
How does the decision in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC (537)
affect your answers?
13. Is the Texas Tech University School of Law Summer Entering
Program constitutional?
14. Define "overinclusive," "underinclusive," "perfectly rational," and
"perfectly irrational," and explain how the same statute can be
both overinclusive and underinclusive. Give examples. How does
all this relate to the due process and equal protection analysis of
purpose versus means?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 591-698.
TRIBE at 1465-1544.
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8-2.2 Alienage
1. Distinguish among three categories of alien discriminations: (1)
state police power, (2) state government function, and (3) federal
programs.
2. How do you explain Plyler v. Doe (548) on a judicial review level?
On a "public policy" level? How should the two levels be kept
distinct?
3. Give the division and analysis in Plyler v. Doe (548) a careful
look. Predict the Justices' voting alignment in a hypothetical
challenge to a state statute denying subsistence welfare benefits to
illegal aliens. Is there a right to travel into the United States that
might apply?
4. How many areas of constitutional analysis scrutinize federal and
state measures in different ways? Why?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 698-718.
TRIBE at 154-453.
8-2.3 Illegitimacy
1. Review the quiz.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 719-35.
TRIBE at 155-358.
8-2.4 Gender
1. Summarize the relevant equal protection analysis for gender
discriminations. Does the analysis change when the government
actor is federal rather than state?
2. How does gender discrimination analysis differ from analysis for
race discrimination? For economic regulations?
3. How do male discriminations and female discriminations compare
as far as constitutionality is concerned? What are sex-role
stereotypes and when are they unconstitutional?
4. Justice Stevens, concurring in Craig v. Boren (566) at 569, says,
"There is only one Equal Protection Clause." What does he
mean? How is he right? How is he wrong?
5. How does the equal protection analysis change when gender and
illegitimacy classifications overlap?
6. Of what applicability is the distinction between de jure and de
facto in gender classifications? How is the de jure requirement
defined?
7. Can the government practice gender discrimination to overcome
the past effects of its own discrimination? What about remedying
past private discrimination in the general society?
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8. Can you articulate the classification in each of the cases in this
section that triggers equal protection analysis?
9. How should a federal court go about ordering a remedy in a
gender discrimination case? What difference does it make
whether the statute is state or federal?
10. Review the hypothetical state university arrangements. State One:
Male State University and Female State University. State Two:
Male State University, Female State University, and State
University.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 736-53.
TRIBE at 155-888.
8-2.5 Wealth and Age
1. What are the applicable standards of equal protection for young
and old and rich and poor?
2. Define a suspect class. Give some examples of suspect classifica-
tions. Give some examples of classifications that are not suspect.
3. What theory of judicial review underlies the protection of
"discrete and insular" minorities?
4. Explain the nexus theory and why the Court rejected it in San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez (584). Reconsider the
theory with Griswold v. Connecticut (635).
5. Was Justice Black correct when he wrote, "Whether the legisla-
ture takes for its textbook Adam Smith, Herbert Spencer, Lord
Keynes, or some other is no concern of ours"? Ferguson v. Skrupa
at 355. How about Karl Marx? Does the Constitution guarantee
a particular economic system?
6. Compare City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center (590) with
Plyler v. Doe (548). How do these holdings fit into the equal
protection framework?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 753-57.
TRIBE at 1588-1627.
8-3. Fundamental Rights
1. What are fundamental rights? What rights are not fundamental?
Think about the Privileges-and-Immunities Clause analysis in The
Slaughter-House Cases (339).
2. How does equal protection analysis apply to fundamental rights?
Reconsider substantive due process.
3. What attributes of access to courts are fundamental? Why? Why
should the government be required to guarantee such rights?
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4. How is the right of access to the courts different from Bill of
Rights guarantees like the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments'
right to counsel?
5. Define indigency, the trigger for state subsidy of fundamental
rights. When does the state have a duty to subsidize? Why may
the state interfere with the attorney-client liberty to contract?
6. Why is the right to vote so important?
7. Explain the justifications for the "one person, one vote" require-
ment. When does it apply? How exact must it be? Why is it
constitutionally impossible to "waive" this right? How are state
apportionments different from congressional apportionments and
why?
8. Compare Justices Douglas's and Black's views on equal protection
in Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections (606).
9. Define the special election exception. Give some examples.
10. Distinguish the right to vote from the right to be a candidate.
What different state interests apply? How may they be achieved?
11. Distinguish among the rights to travel interstate, intrastate and
internationally. What are the sources of each? What are the
individual's interests and the governmental interests in each?
12. In Zobel v. Williams, (622) what is controlling: the level of
scrutiny, the validity of the purpose, or the fit between the means
and the purpose?
13. What are the interests sought to be protected by the constitutional
right to privacy?
14. Trace the Supreme Court's evolution of attribution of the privacy
right within and without the Constitution.
15. Review Griswold v. Connecticut (635). Summarize the Justices'
differing views of judicial review. Can the Court overrule Roe v.
Wade (644) and still preserve the ruling in Griswold?
16. What are the differences between textual and nontextual rights?
Is there a hierarchy of rights in which some are "more preferred"?
17. Use the cases in our books to draft a model state abortion
regulatory statute. Would your statute change if you were asked
to draft a federal statute? How would you draft a statute if you
wanted to restrict the right of privacy as much as constitutionally
possible? How would it read if you wanted to protect the right of
privacy as much as constitutionally possible?
18. Reconsider your answer to question 5 supra with Harris v. McRae
(654).
19. Is Rust v. Sullivan (655) an equal protection case, a due process
case, or a free speech case?
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20. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (656) is
decided on many levels of analysis. Consider separately: stare
decisis in constitutional law; nontextual versus textual rights;
fundamental rights and strict scrutiny; federalism; constitutional
supremacy and uniformity; judicial review versus judicial
supremacy; the role of the Supreme Court; interpretation method-
ology; the right of privacy; the role of public opinion; the rule of
law; and the responsibility of the Court and individual Justices for
the integrity of constitutional law.
21. Notice the debate among the Justices over the role of the Supreme
Court and interpretative methodology in Bowers v. Hardwick
(684).
22. Answer Professor Rotunda's implicit question: "[Is there] a
[federal constitutional] right to die?" Does Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dept. of Health (692) provide much of an answer?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 757-907.
TRIBE at 162-973.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
WORKSHEET NO. 5
Chapter 10. Freedom of Speech.
See generally Kent R. Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989); William Van Alstyne, A Graphic Review
of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CAL. L. REV. 107 (1982).
10-1. Advocacy of Illegal Conduct
1. Identify the distinct interests of government and individual in
each of these cases.
2. Review the evolution of the First Amendment analysis from
Schenk v. United States (725) to Abrams v. United States (726) to
Gitlow v. New York (727) to Brandenburg v. Ohio (733) to Hess v.
Indiana (735). How does your understanding of "the law as it is"
improve when you look back over this history? How would you
rate the performance of the Supreme Court over the years? Can
you draw a Williams diagram to summarize these precedents?
3. Explain Justice Holmes's falsely-yelling-fire-in-a-crowded-theater
analogy in terms of the modern Supreme Court view of the issue.
4. In the modern analysis, what, if any, is the relevance of the
category of speech, the content of the particular statement, the
speaker's subjective intent, the audience's reaction, and the view
of an omniscient observer? What is the significance of the
doctrine of constitutional fact?
5. How important to the First Amendment analysis is the identity
of the decision-maker, judge, or jury? Why?
6. How should the Court decide the hypothetical case of a speaker
who advocates violence through the use of speech that does not
literally or explicitly advocate action, such as Marc Antony's
funeral oration for Caesar in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar, Act III,
scene ii?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 957-69.
TRIBE at 841-49.
10-2. Prior Restraint
1. Distinguish between a subsequent punishment of speech and a
prior restraint. Give some examples. What is so important about
the distinction for purposes of the First Amendment?
2. If prior restraints are so pernicious, why are they not unconstitu-
tional per se? When are they constitutional?
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3. Consider New York Times Co. v. United States (737). Does the
decision make any law, good or bad? Does it explain when the
press may be enjoined from publishing information in its
possession? What outcome if Congress had passed a statute
authorizing federal courts to issue national security injunctions?
How may the case be viewed as a decision on the doctrine of
separation of powers?
4. How narrow is the holding in Snepp v. United States (746)?
5. How does the analysis change when the press is the burglar
instead of the recipient of the burglar's take?
6. How has the Court protected the government's ownership in the
information it generates, collects, and preserves? How narrow are
the rights of access and dissemination? Does the analysis change
moving from a general public right of access to a press right of
access?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 969-78.
TRIBE at 1039-54.
10-3. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions and the Public Forum
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 1082-1106.
TRIBE at 977-1010.
10-3.1 The Procedural Context
1. Distinguish generally between facial challenges and challenges as
applied.
2. Describe the content and distinguish among the First Amendment
concepts of "vagueness," "overbreadth," and "least restrictive
means.
3. Explain "reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions." What
about content neutrality? Can government excise whole types of
speech?
4. A refuses to apply for a permit, marches, and is convicted. B
applies for but is denied a permit, marches, and is convicted. C,
under an injunction not to march, marches and is held in
contempt. What are the differences among the three? Are there
any constitutional limits on the state's power to punish C?
5. Would a parade ordinance that charged a $1.50 registration fee be
constitutional?
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10-3.2 Protection of the Public From Fraud and Annoyance
1. Distinguish the new substantial overbreadth doctrine from the
former overbreadth doctrine. How is overbreadth analysis related
to standing? See generally Tribe at 1024-30.
10-3.3 Defining the Public Forum
1. Justice Roberts once wrote, "Wherever the title of streets and
parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring). Justice Holmes, when a state
judge, once wrote, "For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally
to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more
an infringement of the rights of a member of the public than for
the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house." Common-
wealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895), aff'd sub nom., Davis
v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897). Who was correct?
2. What is a "public forum?" Where are they found? What First
Amendment rules apply there? Why? Reconsider Marsh v.
Alabama (420) as a public forum case. Reconsider Hudgens v.
N.L.R.B. (422) as a public forum case. Is the state constitution
a better basis upon which to proceed?
3. Explain the three categories used in Perry Educational Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n (768). Apply this analysis to the
previously decided cases in the notes at 776-84.
4. How is equal protection doctrine related to the public forum
analysis?
10-3.4 Government Subsidization of Speech
1. Does Rust v. Sullivan (792) make more (or less) sense as a First
Amendment decision? Recall that the regulations at issue there
have since been set aside.
10-3.5 Injunctions and the Public Forum
1. Is the holding in Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. (Supp.)
best understood as an equal protection decision? How does Chief
Justice Rehnquist reconcile his vote here with his vote in Rust
(792)? Is this just another judicial-injunctions-are-different
holding like Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham (756)? Does this
decision have anything to do with the early commercial speech
cases, see note 2 at 859-60?
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10-4. Fighting Words and Hostile Audiences
1. How are conduct convictions and speech convictions distin-
guished?
2. Define the fighting words doctrine. How is it justified? How
broad is the exception?
3. Why does the first amendment protect the emotion of the speaker
but not the state's efforts in favor of the listener's emotions?
4. Distinguish among the following: one-on-one confrontations; a
speaker versus a hostile audience; a group protest versus a single
heckler; two groups in simultaneous, mutually hostile protest; a
speaker exhorting a receptive audience to action.
5. What is the uncertain relevance of human emotion in constitu-
tional law generally? See William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion
and "The Progress of the Law," 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3 (1988).
6. What does Justice Scalia's opinion in R.A. V. v. St. Paul (805) add
to the fighting words doctrine? What implications does his
opinion have for the phenomenon commonly referred to as
"political correctness"?
7. Can you reconcile Wisconsin v. Mitchell (Supp.) with R.A.V?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 1057-62.
TRIBE at 849-56.
10-5. Special Problems of the Broadcast Media
1. Suppose a state statute guaranteed that the poor be informed on
public issues by obligating newspapers to give copies away to
indigents. How would the constitutional issue be decided and
why?
2. "A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated." Miami Herald Co. v.
Tornillo (819, 820). What does this observation mean for the
theory of the First Amendment? Does it describe the provision's
history?
3. How far can Congress go in creating a statutory right of public
access to the electronic media?
4. What is the "fairness doctrine"? What is its source and justifica-
tion? Is it constitutional? Does the Constitution require it?
5. Explain the captive audience problem.
6. What is the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions?
7. Looking ahead, what constitutional issues do you contemplate will
arise in future regulation of the cable television industry? Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (Supp.).
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NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 978-94.
TRIBE at 944-55.
10-6. The Press and the Criminal Justice System
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 997-1011.
TRIBE at 856-61 & 955-77.
10-6.1 Protection of Confidential Sources
1. Suppose a reporter writes a story about homosexual con-
duct-which is illegal under the penal code of the state-between
an unidentified, sitting state judge and two practicing attorneys,
who the reporter claims admitted to the conduct in confidential
interviews. When the state judicial affairs commission investi-
gates, the reporter refuses to cooperate. How much of a precedent
is Branzburg v. Hayes (833)? If the reporter discloses the identity
of his two sources, may they sue and recover under a breach-of-
contract theory? If the report proves to be untrue, may the judge
sue and recover under a false-light tort theory?
2. What are the speech model and the structural model of the Free
Press Clause? Is there a constitutional difference between the
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses? Define "the press."
3. If you were a magistrate, what questions would you ask and what
answers would satisfy you before you issued a warrant to search
Dan Rather's office? Consider the Constitution and the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980.
10-6.2 Fair Trial and Free Press
1. What are "sensational trials"? What values in conflict yield what
analysis? Distinguish between after-the-fact and before-the-fact
remedies.
2. Describe the narrowing of the prior restraint analysis in this area.
How are limits on publication different from limits on access
here?
3. What interests compete within the question whether criminal
trials should be televised live? What about state executions?
4. How and why are civil trials differently analyzed?
5. Is there a constitutional right of access to televise the oral
arguments at the Supreme Court of the United States? Is this a
public forum issue? Would it be a good idea?
6. Does an attorney representing a defendant in a criminal case have
a greater or a lesser First Amendment protection for speech




1. What is commercial speech? What are the arguments for
inclusion and exclusion in First Amendment doctrine?
2. What are the differences between commercial speech and fully
protected speech and how are those differences handled in the
theory?
3. What issues remain undecided in the area of legal advertising?
Do Edenfield (Supp.) and Ibenez (Supp.) taken together portend a
rethinking of the Supreme Court's assumptions regarding the First
Amendment and bar restrictions on attorney in-person solicita-
tion?
4. When can advertising be banned? How can it always be regulat-
ed? Is Ladue v. Gilleo (Supp.) a commercial speech case?
5. Apply the test in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. RS.C.
(855) to the bans on alcohol and smoking advertisements on
television. Would the analysis be different for condom commer-
cials?
6. In what direction is the Court heading, considering Posadas de
Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico (866)? Do the
Supplement cases follow in the same direction?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 1011-35.
TRIBE at 890-904.
10-8. Defamation and Privacy
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 1035-57.
TRIBE at 861-90.
10-8.1 Defamation
1. Review the class discussion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
(874).
2. Define these terms: actual malice, public official, general public
figure, and limited public figure. Give examples of each.
3. Describe the federal rule established in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. (882).
4. Why was Mrs. Mary Alice Firestone not a public figure? Is Dean
Newton a public figure? Professor Baker?
5. How does Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
(887) change constitutional law? Apply the analysis to the facts
in Sullivan and Gertz. Is Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. (891)
somehow still a viable precedent?
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6. If there is no dichotomy between "opinion" and "fact" (Milkovich
(894)), then what does the First Amendment have to do with
fabricated quotations in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine (881)?
10-8.2 Privacy
1. May a state allow a tort recovery for publication of true informa-
tion which is highly personal and private? What is the relevance
of Shelley v. Kraemer (432)?
2. Does the First Amendment protect sports and other entertain-
ments? How? Why? Are they only commercial speech? How
may state law protect the athletes' and performers' proprietary
commercial interests in such activities?
3. What are the First Amendment concerns in private suits regard-
ing (1) false light situations, (2) appropriations of name or
likeness, (3) publication of private details, and (4) commercial
publicity about performers?
4. How does Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
(887) affect holdings in this area?
5. How has the Supreme Court reconciled the Copyright Clause with
the First Amendment?
6. Why is there no distinction between "opinion" and "fact" in the
constitutional law of defamation?
10.9. The Right of Association
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 1062-82.
TRIBE at 1400-35.
10-9.1 Inquiries into Associations
1. What is the derivation of the right of association? Compare Roe
v. Wade (644), Bowers v. Hardwick (684), San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez (584), Plyler v. Doe (548), and NOW
v. Scheidler (Supp.).
10-9.2 Loyalty Oaths
1. What is the meaning of the following questions from the
Declaration of an Intention to Study Law? Are they constitution-
al?
8. (a) Can you conscientiously, and do you, affirm that without
mental reservation, you are loyal to and ready to support the
Constitution of the United States and of the State of Texas?
(Yes or No) If not, please explain.
(b) Have you ever organized or helped to organize or become a
member of an organization or group of persons which, during
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the period of your membership or association, you knew was
advocating or teaching that the government of the United
States or any state or political subdivision thereof should be
overthrown by force, violence, or any unlawful means? (Yes
or No) If your answer is in the affirmative, state the facts.
2. Reconcile the cases here with the cases in Section 10-1, Advocacy
of Illegal Conduct.
3. If the Texas Bar would take the same pro-choice position as the
A.B.A. has taken on the issue of the Right of Privacy, what
constitutional objection could be raised by a pro-life member?
10-9.3 Patronage Dismissals
1. What is patronage and how does the Constitution limit the
practice? Why?
2. How do you explain the power of the government to prohibit its
employees from engaging in certain types of partisan political
activities which otherwise would be fully protected for private
citizens?
10-9.4 Regulating the Membership of Associations
1. Distinguish freedom of intimate association from the freedom of
expressive association.
2. Reconsider the question in Worksheet No. 4 about gender
restrictions at hypothetical state universities.
10-10. Symbolic Speech
1. Can you draw bright lines between conduct, symbolic speech, and
pure speech? What are the justifications for each category?
2. How can the Court require motivational analysis in Brd. of
Education v. Pico (936) having rejected it in United States v.
O'Brien (931)?
3. Is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
(934) a symbolic speech case or a public forum case? See
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (781).
4. Is Wayte v. United States (938) a symbolic speech decision or a
selective prosecution decision?
5. After Texas v. Johnson (938) and United States v. Eichman (946),
what does symbolic speech mean?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 1106-17.
TRIBE at 594-601.
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10-11. Campaign Financing
1. What is the dilemma in regulation of campaign speech?
2. Distinguish, as did the Court, among contribution limits,
expenditure limits, disclosure requirements, and public subsidies.
3. Review the notes at 957-60. Is there any relevance to the "access
to ballot" principles in Chapter 8, §8-3.24? Is there any constitu-
tional way for Congress to respond meaningfully to the problems
of campaign financing?
4. What is the state's role in this area? What are the First Amend-
ment limits on the police power? What is the relevance of
republican political theory to the constitutional issues?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA at 1117-28.
TRIBE at 113-253.
10-12. Obscenity
1. How is the obscene defined so as to place such material beyond
any protection of the First Amendment?
2. Explain the difficulty in defining and applying the concept.
3. What are the alternatives between no protection and complete
protection for all erotic material?
4. What is "variable obscenity"? How does the constitutional
analysis change? What about "pandering"?
5. Is there a right-to-privacy argument in viewing pornography?
6. What is the role of the jury in deciding the scope of the First
Amendment?
7. How may zoning be used to regulate erotic material?
8. How does prior-restraint analysis bend for obscenity?
9. What impact on the constitutional analysis is felt from the
Twenty-First Amendment?
10. How would you predict the Court's future review of antipornogra-
phy statutes that define and prohibit material that is harmful and
coercive of women and reinforces false notions of male suprema-
cy?
11. Consider the constitutionality of Pub. L. No. 101-121, 103 Stat.
740, which provides in part:
(a) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated for the National
Endowment of the Arts or the National Endowment for the
Humanities may be used to promote, disseminate, or produce
materials which in the judgment of the National Endowment for the
Arts or the National Endowment for the Humanities may be
considered obscene, including but not limited to, depictions of
sadomasochism, homoeroticism, the sexual exploitation of children,
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or individuals engaged in sex acts and which, when taken as a
whole, do not have a serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
12. Does Justice Stewart really only know it when he sees it? Is John
Mortimer (author of the Rumpole stories) correct in saying, "We
used to be told that, in America, obscenity was that which would
give Mr. Justice Frankfurter an erection. As Mr. Justice Frank-
furter got older, the definition became slightly more relaxed."
Robert F. Henley, A Conversation with John Mortimer, Litigation,
Winter 1989, at 22. Is this ultimately and simply the "rule of 5"?
13. Can you reconcile the holding in Alexander v. U.S. (Supp.) with
what the Court said about punitive civil damages in Honda Motor
Co., Ltd. v. Oberg (Supp.)?
14. Read Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner's opinion in Miller v. Civil
City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Posner, J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (997). Is nude dancing symbolic
speech?
NOWAK & ROTUNDA 1134-56.
TRIBE at 904-28.
P.S. Now, at the end of the course, what do you think Professor Mark
Tushnet meant when he ended his book Red, White and Blue-A
Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 318 (1988) with this conclusion:
Critique is all there is.
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